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Reviewed by Doug Williams
The mass of statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions that constitute 
the contemporary field of “environmental law” falls dramatically short of 
protecting the resources on which present and future generations will depend for 
a secure and sustainable planet. An aggressive judicial response to this failing, 
drawing upon the “public trust” doctrine, may well be the last and best hope 
of avoiding environmental disaster. That is the extended thesis of Professor 
Mary Christina Wood’s impassioned plea in Nature’s Trust:  Environmental Law for 
a New Ecological Age for “a full paradigm shift” in environmental law and land 
management (207).1
Professor Wood’s thesis recalls Professor Joseph Sax’s 1970 landmark 
article detailing the public benefits that might be secured by expanded judicial 
application of the public trust doctrine.2 Against a background of relative 
quiescence on the part of state and federal legislatures, Professor Sax wrote 
that only the public trust doctrine was of sufficient “breadth and substantive 
content” to serve “as a tool of general application for citizens seeking to 
develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management problems.”3 
Sax acknowledged that “[t]he ‘public trust’ has no life of its own and no 
intrinsic content. It is no more—and no less—than a name courts give to their 
concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic process.”4 Nonetheless, 
he believed that the courts, in invoking the doctrine, would tend “to promote 
1. Aside from Professor Wood’s work, the effort to reinvigorate the public trust doctrine has 
gained many adherents in recent years. See, e.g., Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public 
Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 Wake For. J. L. & PoL’y 281 (2014); Michael C. Blumm & Rachel 
D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory 
Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. Davis L. rev. 741 (2012); Alexandra B. Klass, 
Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 Notre Dame L. rev. 
699 (2006); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working 
Change from Within, 15 s.e. eNvtL. L. J. 223 (2006). 
2. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 
miCh. L. rev. 471 (1970). 
3. Id. at 474.
4. Id. at 521.
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rational management of our natural resources,” and “show[] more insight and 
sensitivity to many of the fundamental problems of resource management 
than . . . any of the other branches of government.”5
Despite massive legislative and administrative activity in the forty-plus 
years since Professor Sax wrote his seminal article, Professor Wood reinvokes 
Sax’s belief that it will be the courts rather than legislatures and administrative 
agencies that will address the “fundamental problems” we currently face, 
including global climate change. Professor Wood contends that our political 
branches have become so captured by corporate interests that it is almost 
foolhardy to believe they will take the actions necessary to ward off impending 
ecological crises. Administrative agencies, in particular, Wood insists, have 
abused both the discretion legislatures have given them and the deference 
courts have extended to them, and in the process “have turned environmental 
law inside out.” (9). Instead of protecting critical resources, U.S. agencies, 
including the Environmental Protection Agency, have effectively offered 
permits to destroy natural resources to the highest corporate bidders. In Wood’s 
words: “Despite its original goals, environmental law now institutionalizes a 
marriage of power and wealth behind the veil of bureaucratic formality.” (103). 
The courts, she argues, must force a divorce, decreeing that an unholy alliance 
give way to a more perfect union between the agencies and the people those 
agencies are duty-bound to serve. The mechanism for securing this transition 
is a “prism of long-standing, inherent, and deeply understood public property 
rights”—a rebranded version of the public trust doctrine known as Nature’s 
Trust (140).
By Professor Wood’s reckoning, Nature’s Trust is not just a description of 
the undoubted responsibility of legislatures and agencies to use their authorities 
in ways to promote the public good. Indeed, the trust is distinguishable 
from the States’ common law “police powers” and the federal government’s 
constitutional legislative authority, which are often viewed as the source of 
authority for governments to regulate private and public activity to protect 
environmental values and resources.6 Instead, Nature’s Trust is a full-blown 
elaboration of property rights, enforceable by the courts at the behest of those 
who hold them—namely, all citizens.7
As trustees, governments owe a specific set of substantive, fiduciary, and 
procedural duties to trust beneficiaries. In particular, trustees must protect 
trust assets, prevent waste or substantial impairment of these assets, maximize 
5. Id. at 565-66. 
6. For a discussion of the relationship between the public trust and police powers, see Christine 
Cress, It’s Time to Let Go:  Why the Atmospheric Trust Won’t Help the World Breathe Easier, 92 N.C. L. 
rev. 236, 265-67 (2014); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in 
Natural Resources:  Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 ioWa L. rev. 631, 665-79 (1986).
7. For Wood’s distinction between “police powers” and the public trust, see pages 127-28. 
Professor Wood also internationalizes Nature’s Trust, extending its beneficiaries to include 
citizens all over the world and its responsibilities and duties to all governments. For 
simplicity, I will focus in this essay only on the domestic version of Nature’s Trust.
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the value of the assets, restore damaged assets, recover damages from those 
who have caused such damage, and refrain from selling trust resources 
into private hands, except in limited circumstances (167). In addition, 
trustees owe undivided loyalty to trust beneficiaries and must adequately 
supervise their agents, employ good faith and reasonable skill, apply the 
precautionary principle in managing resources, and operate in a transparent 
manner complemented by disclosure obligations sufficient to keep the trust 
beneficiaries informed of the state of the trust’s assets (189).
The breadth of the trustees’ responsibilities is informed in part  by the 
scope of the trust res—the resources in which citizens are deemed to hold 
common property rights and to which the trustees’ fiduciary obligation 
run. Traditionally, the public trust doctrine has been limited to protecting 
lands lying beneath navigable waters, and courts have tended not to venture 
far beyond navigable waters in vindicating claims that the trust has been 
breached.8 Wood, however, like Sax before her,9 argues for an expansion of 
the trust res, one sufficient to meet the essential purpose of her ecologically-
informed view of Nature’s Trust. That purpose is to “sustain all foreseeable 
future generations of humanity”—to establish and maintain a “survival account” 
for humanity (143). To serve this purpose, the trust must “protect[] both the 
natural infrastructure essential to societal welfare and the public’s right to use 
such ecological wealth.” (146). Accordingly, “virtually all categories of natural 
resources merit protection as assets in the trust—air and atmosphere, surface 
waters, groundwater, dry sand beaches, wildlife, fisheries, plant life, wetlands, 
soils, minerals and energy sources, forests, grasslands, and public lands.”(157).10
Professor Wood’s expanded view of the public trust doctrine is grounded 
in what she describes as “natural law—‘the law which natural reason appoints 
for all mankind.’” (126)11 With this grounding, the trust “forms the sovereign 
architecture around which the Constitution and all other laws meld”; it “holds 
constitutional magnitude and . . . doctrinal supremacy over contrary laws.” 
(129). Thus, in Wood’s view, the Supreme Court erred in PPL Montana, LLC v. 
Montana,12 when it described the public trust doctrine as “a matter of state law 
. . . subject . . . to the federal power to regulate vessels and navigation under the 
commerce clause” of the Constitution (133). Instead, “[t]he trust emerges twin-
8. See, e.g., Klass, supra note 1, at 712 (“very few, if any, courts have extended the common law 
doctrine beyond tidal or navigable waters.”).
9. See Sax, supra note 2, at 556 (“it seems that the delicate mixture of procedural and substantive 
protections which the courts have applied in conventional public trust cases would be 
equally applicable and equally appropriate in controversies” involving a range of natural 
resources).
10. The six factors Wood relies on to expand the scope of the trust are as follows: “(1) public 
need; (2) scarcity; (3) customary use and reasonable expectation; (4) unique and irreplaceable 
common heritage; (5) suitability for common use; and (6) ancillary function.” (157).
11. Citing Caesar FLaviUs JUstiNiaN, the iNstitUtes oF JUstiNiaN With eNgLish 
iNtroDUCtioN, traNsLatioN aND Notes §12.1 (Thomas Collett Sanders, trans., 1984).
12. 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012).
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born with democracy,” (128), and “[a]ny government deriving its authority 
from the people never gains delegated authority to manage resources in a way 
that would jeopardize present or future generations or compromise crucial 
public needs.” (129).
The mechanism for the people to assert these natural rights and to hold 
government trustees to their fiduciary obligations is, of course, litigation in the 
courts. Indeed, the impending ecological crises “demand judicial intervention 
to rein in runaway agencies, arrest the siphoning of natural wealth belonging to 
the public, and re-anchor environmental law to its original moorings of justice, 
public interest, and community morality.” (232). To Wood’s dismay, however, 
modern courts have largely abdicated the responsibility to protect the public 
trust, presiding over—indeed, encouraging—a shift in which administrative 
agencies have become “the new tribunals of justice” and the judiciary has 
been reduced “to a mere twig of its original” constitutional stature (p. 231). 
Nonetheless, while acknowledging that “[a]rriving at judicial public trust 
remedies for captured agencies and legislatures will not be easy,” (256), Wood 
holds out great hope that the courts will find the courage to meet their duty to 
“gather[] the shifting sands of time onto the scales of justice” and “vindicate[] 
the rights of the people as beneficiaries of Nature’s Trust….” (257).
Wood acknowledges that an expansion of the public trust doctrine may 
require courts to enter territory in which that have traditionally been reluctant 
to venture. Unprecedented judicial intervention in administrative processes 
may be necessary to ensure effective remedies in the face of bureaucratic 
intransigence and resistance. Courts may be required to develop administrative 
capacity and issue structural injunctions establishing “a surrogate judicial-
administrative process” to oversee the performance of administrative agencies 
(248). While such an “activist” judicial role “surpasses the traditional role 
of courts,” (241), Wood is confident that courts are up to the task. They can 
engage in “measured judicial supervision” of agencies and legislatures by 
developing plans that include “measurable steps” that must be taken and by 
“providing oversight to ensure proper execution of the plan.” (250).
As sweeping and elegant as Wood’s Nature’s Trust may be, her trust in 
the courts to provide the necessary impetus to solve pending environmental 
crises is, at best, overly optimistic.  It is likely true that judges face less 
pressure from corporate and moneyed interests than legislators and agencies, 
but that freedom from direct lobbying does not necessarily translate into 
greater concern for protection of natural resources or greater institutional 
competence and capacity. There is no compelling reason to believe that 
courts, which are by nature conservative, will be willing to take action that 
agencies and legislatures have been unwilling to take. Nor is there any reason 
to believe that, even if courts do take action, the results will be significantly 
better management of natural resources.13 Most courts that have addressed 
13. Wood suggests that courts can effectively manage complex environmental problems 
through innovative remedies like structural injunctions (240-57). In my view, Wood 
underestimates the difficulties in fashioning such remedies, particularly given the inter-
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public trust objections to the way in which resources have been managed by 
agencies and legislatures, particularly “super wicked” problems like global 
climate change,14 have concluded that the courts are not the appropriate forum 
in which to air such grievances.15
In the end, Nature’s Trust’s greatest contribution may not be as a legal 
strategy to remedy the failings of  current environmental law, but as a 
reminder to the public generally that our future is dependent on much greater, 
and sustained, moral commitments to respect the limits of natural resources 
to support the kind of environment in which we desire to live. Professor 
Wood herself acknowledges that “judicial relief  must find grounding in 
the broader context of society’s moral understandings.” (257). Until  these 
understandings are more fully developed, law will be at best a primitive 
mechanism for the kind of change Wood contends is necessary. Even more 
important, if and when a more fully developed sense of the moral impropriety 
of massive environmental degradation takes hold, it will likely be unnecessary 
for the courts to play the role of revolutionary heroes. Instead, citizens will 
demand more responsive political institutions–ones deserving of public trust.
jurisdictional dimensions of such problems. Problems like global climate change would not 
be amenable to remedies from one jurisdiction. Indeed, a coordinated and consistent set of 
remedial obligations across state, national, and international jurisdictions would have to be 
fashioned—a result that seems at best dubious.
14. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the 
Future, 94 CorNeLL L. rev. 1153, 1158 (2009).
15. See Cress, supra note 6, at 259-64. In June 2014, the D.C. Circuit affirmed in an unpublished 
decision a district court decision dismissing public trust claims challenging the federal 
government’s failure adequately to address global climate change. The court concluded that 
the public trust doctrine is a matter of state law and does not present a federal question to 
support federal court jurisdiction. See Alec L. v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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